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Abstract 
Machine Learning (ML) is an important component of computer science and a mainstream way 
of making sense of large amounts of data. Although the technology is establishing new 
possibilities in different fields, there are also problems to consider, one of which is bias. Due to 
the inductive reasoning of ML algorithms in creating mathematical models, the predictions and 
trends found by the models will never necessarily be true – just more or less probable. Knowing 
this, it is unreasonable for us to expect the applied deductive reasoning of these models to ever 
be fully unbiased. Therefore, it is important that we set expectations for ML that account for the 
limitations of reality. 
The current conversation of ML regards how and when to implement the technology to mitigate 
the effect of bias on its results. This thesis suggests that the question of “whether” should be 
addressed first. We tackle the issue of bias from the standpoint of justice and fairness in ML, 
developing a framework tasked with determining whether the implementation of a specific ML 
model is warranted. We accomplish this by emphasizing the liberal values that drive our 
definitions of societal fairness and justice, such as the separateness of persons, moral evaluation, 
freedom and understanding of choice, and accountability for wrongdoings.1  
 
1 An immense “thank you” to Dr. Noreen Herzfeld for her limitless encouragement and mentorship throughout the 
development of this work.  
4 
 
Contents 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 6 
2 Background .......................................................................................................................................... 7 
2.1 Machine Learning .......................................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.1 Supervised Learning................................................................................................................ 7 
2.1.1.2 Methods and Black-Box Models ........................................................................................... 9 
2.2 Biases .......................................................................................................................................... 10 
2.2.1 Dataset Bias .......................................................................................................................... 10 
2.2.2 Algorithmic Bias ................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.3 Hardware Bias ...................................................................................................................... 12 
2.3 Cognitive Source of Dataset and Algorithmic Bias ....................................................................... 12 
2.4 Inductive and Deductive Reasoning ............................................................................................. 14 
2.4.1 The Problem of Induction ...................................................................................................... 15 
2.5 Justice and Fairness in ML ........................................................................................................... 15 
2.6 Full Accommodation of Fairness .................................................................................................. 16 
2.7 Problem Statement ....................................................................................................................... 17 
3 Current State of the Field .................................................................................................................... 19 
3.1 Fairness Verification .................................................................................................................... 19 
3.2 Non-Empirical Feedback Loops ................................................................................................... 19 
3.3 Current Fairness Criteria .............................................................................................................. 20 
3.3.1 Anti-Classification ................................................................................................................ 20 
3.3.2 Classification Parity .............................................................................................................. 21 
3.3.3 Calibration ............................................................................................................................ 22 
3.4 Mutual Exclusivity of Fairness Criteria ........................................................................................ 22 
3.5 Theoretical Versus Empirical Observations .................................................................................. 23 
4 Development of Framework ............................................................................................................... 24 
4.1 Distributive Justice ...................................................................................................................... 24 
4.1.1 John Rawls’ Justice as Fairness ............................................................................................. 24 
4.2 Compensatory Justice .................................................................................................................. 28 
4.3 Moral Evaluation ......................................................................................................................... 29 
4.3.1 Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator ......................................................................................... 30 
4.3.2 Algorithmic Auditing ............................................................................................................ 31 
4.4 Freedom of Choice ...................................................................................................................... 31 
4.4.1 Choice of Task Avoidance .................................................................................................... 32 
4.4.2 Choice of Non-ML Alternatives ............................................................................................ 33 
5 
 
4.4.3 Explainable and Interpretable ML ......................................................................................... 35 
4.5 Accountability ............................................................................................................................. 37 
4.6 Pre-Implementation Flowchart ..................................................................................................... 39 
4.7 Post-Implementation Accountability ............................................................................................ 39 
4.7.1 Restorative Justice................................................................................................................. 40 
4.7.2 Criminal Justice .................................................................................................................... 41 
4.7.3 Additional Comments ........................................................................................................... 42 
5 Reflections on Work and Future Areas of Research............................................................................. 43 
6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 45 
7 References .......................................................................................................................................... 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In the past few decades, humans have made technological progress on an exponential scale. 
Moore’s law, although unable to precisely predict future advancements, emphasizes the 
remarkable improvements we have made in the field of computer science. We have witnessed 
exponential growth in both computational power and clock speeds, which inevitably are 
expanding the possibilities within the field.2  
As we are broadening the capabilities of computers and specifically artificial intelligence (AI), 
we are exploring new applications. Some of these aid us in addressing the shortcomings of 
humans, increasing both time- and task efficiency.  An example is the concept of self-driving 
cars. In 2018, the number of traffic deaths exceeded 40,000 for the third consecutive year; about 
110 deaths daily. In 92 (±2) percent of cases, the accident could be attributed to human error. 
This means that AI, although it would add a small computing error, has the potential to save 
many lives by removing all or most of the unreliable human factor in car accidents.3 Our 
respective economies will have to adapt to changes posed by these new developments. 
Nevertheless, there is definite potential to help human beings lead better lives.  
However, these advancements do not come without repercussions.  In the endeavor of continuing 
our technological explorations and addressing more complex issues, we are facing new 
challenges in different aspects of development and application. One of these challenges is bias in 
artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, whose foundation is machine learning. These biases 
are not mere theoretical obstacles but have grave practical consequences for many undeserving 
individuals (which will become evident as we proceed). For the purpose of this work, we intend 
to explore the shortcomings of the machine learning models that lead to these biases, and how 
we could address them by being more conscientious about how, but especially when we 
implement the technology.  
In this endeavor, we have tasked ourselves with developing a framework that will consider the 
current impact of bias in machine learning and its relevance to societal injustices, to give 
recommendations on whether implementation of a given machine learning model is warranted in 
the given context. In the following sections, we will explore fundamental themes that such a 
framework should include and use a bottom-up approach to establish its components 
accordingly.  
 
 
2 Roser, Max, and Hannah Ritchie. “Technological Progress.” Our World in Data, 2020. 
https://ourworldindata.org/technological-progress. 
3 “Traffic Safety Facts: A Brief Statistical Summary.” U.S Department of Transportation, 2015. 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115 
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2 Background 
 
2.1 Machine Learning 
Machine learning (ML) is the ability for computers, through analysis of extensive datasets, to 
find trends and make predictions using statistical models. It is the foundation of how many AI 
applications learn, find patterns in data and predict outcomes based on previous subjects.  The 
figure below outlines only a subset of all available ML techniques. 
 
Figure 1: A subset of available ML techniques. 4 
2.1.1 Supervised Learning 
There are distinctions to be made between different types of ML. The main type of learning we 
will consider is supervised learning, which makes use of pre-defined labels to classify and find 
patterns in data. In other words, unlike unsupervised learning, there are right and wrong answers 
for the model to consider for each subject fed to it. An example of supervised learning is feeding 
an algorithm a dataset filled with photos containing certain objects, along with the categories 
they belong to. ML would attempt to categorize future subjects using what was seen in previous 
examples. Not surprisingly, it is a complicated task that could go wrong. This was exactly the 
case when, in 2015, Google received widespread criticism for Google Photos erroneously 
labeling two Black individuals as gorillas.5 It is these types of discrimination and unfairness we 
will continue discussing.  
 
4 Ackermann, Nils. “Artificial Intelligence Framework: A Visual Introduction to Machine Learning and AI.” 
Medium. Towards Data Science, December 15, 2018. https://towardsdatascience.com/artificial-intelligence-
framework-a-visual-introduction-to-machine-learning-and-ai-d7e36b304f87. 
5 Pachal, Pete. “Google Photos Identified Two Black People as 'Gorillas'.” Mashable. Mashable, July 1, 2015. 
https://mashable.com/2015/07/01/google-photos-black-people-gorillas/?europe=true. 
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Figure 2: Classification and regression – the two types of supervised learning tasks. 6 
2.1.1.1 Tasks 
The type of task performed in the above-mentioned example is called classification. It focuses on 
categorizing subjects into different classes based on how different they are from other classes. 
The other type of task is regression, which looks at similarities in the data that could help predict 
a certain numerical value. Predicting how likely prisoners are to recidivate by assigning risk 
scores to them is an example of a regression task. Worth noting is that regression tasks could be 
considered a type of classification, in that a numerical threshold could be assigned to decide on 
which category a certain numerical value belongs to (in the recidivism example these categories 
could regard the approval or denial of bail or parole).  In other words, classification is discrete 
(categorical), whereas regression is continuous.7 
 
6 A Visual Introduction to Machine Learning.  
7 Brownlee, Jason. “Difference Between Classification and Regression in Machine Learning.” Machine Learning 
Mastery, May 21, 2019. https://machinelearningmastery.com/classification-versus-regression-in-machine-learning/. 
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Figure 3: The process of ML.8 
2.1.1.2 Methods and Black-Box Models 
As seen in Figure 1, we use numerous approaches to complete classification and regression 
tasks.9 Oftentimes, these tasks become complex to the extent that the models by which they are 
solved become hard to make sense of without additional tools. These models are referred to as 
black-box models due to their high complexity. We will specifically address these models later.10 
There are chiefly two types of complexity that contribute to black-box models – dimensionality 
and the type of ML technique.  
2.1.1.2.1 Dimensionality 
Dimensionality is the number of attributes (or factors) that are considered by a ML algorithm. 
For complex problems, such as predicting types of cancer in human beings based on gene 
expression, it is not uncommon to consider datasets with more than 1,000 different genes, with 
each of them being considered an independent attribute.11  
In ML, it is commonly known that as the number of attributes considered increases, so does the 
difficulty of analyzing the data in question. This is often referred to as the curse of 
dimensionality due to the resulting complications, most of which regard the difficulty of 
assessing how the model in question arrives at a certain decision, but also the increased 
 
8 Visual Introduction to Machine Learning. 
9 See 2.1. 
10 See 4.4.3.  
11 Molla, Michael, Michael Waddell, David Page, and Jude Shavlik. “Using Machine Learning to Design and 
Interpret Gene-Expression Microarrays.” AI Magazine on Bioinformatics, 2004. 
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likelihood of the model reflecting the specifics of its training dataset and not performing as well 
on other datasets made for the task in question.12  
2.1.1.2.2 Technique Type  
Some ML techniques are obviously better for certain tasks and some techniques are more 
complex and ambiguous than others. Neural networks, for instance – the technique by which 
deep learning (a subset of ML) is deployed – are heavily used to display complex behavior in 
computers, as seen in AI.13 They attempt to model the way our brains arrive at conclusions, 
which is a complicated and diverse process due to how little we know about the brain.14  
These techniques are usually called explainable models, as they are not intuitive in the same way 
as other models and require measures (such as writing a summary program) to explain them.15 
Not all explainable models are supervised learning, although some are and will be covered in 
detail as we discuss the impact of black-box models on bias. 16 
2.2 Biases 
Figure 3 describes the process of properly deploying ML. There is bias to consider in all 
mentioned steps, but they can be classified as two distinct types: dataset bias and algorithmic 
bias. 
2.2.1 Dataset Bias 
Everything a ML algorithm learns is based on input data, which means that if our data are 
flawed, we will never receive an acceptable output.17 Each ML model must first be given a 
training dataset, which is used to help the model understand the relationships between all 
attributes in the data and the classifications given to each subject. If the dataset has biases, so 
will the model.  
A commonly discussed application of ML, which has received much criticism for its uneven 
performance, is classifying gender in human beings. Gender Shades is a project, conducted by 
MIT Media Lab, which explores gender- and racial bias in well-known facial recognition 
algorithms. The project specifically chose to consider facial recognition software made by three 
companies: IBM, Microsoft and Megvii.  
At first glance, the algorithms display high overall gender classification accuracies (between 
94% and 87% for all three). However, when we consider the misclassified cases, biases become 
 
12 Tan, Pang-Ning, Anuj Karpatne, Vipin Kumar, and Michael Steinbach. Introduction to Data Mining. Harlow: 
Pearson, 2020. 
13 Ibid. 
14 “5 Unsolved Mysteries about the Brain.” Allen Institute for Brain Science, March 14, 2019. 
https://alleninstitute.org/what-we-do/brain-science/news-press/articles/5-unsolved-mysteries-about-brain. 
15 Molnar, Christopher. Interpretable Machine Learning: A Guide for Making Black Box Models Explainable. 
GitHub, 2020.  
16 Mols, Bennie. “In Black Box Algorithms We Trust (or Do We?).” ACM, March 16, 2017. 
https://cacm.acm.org/news/214618-in-black-box-algorithms-we-trust-or-do-we/fulltext. 
17 Sharma, Dhruv. “Problems in Machine Learning Models? Check Your Data First.” Medium. Towards Data 
Science, August 31, 2019. https://towardsdatascience.com/problems-in-machine-learning-models-check-your-data-
first-f6c2c88c5ec2. 
11 
 
evident. With Microsoft’s software, 93.6% of times faces were mistaken, the subject was Black. 
With Megvii’s Face++ software, 95.9% of misclassifications were made when the subject was a 
woman. And, with IBM’s software, the misclassification rate of darker women was 34.4% higher 
than that of lighter men.18 These are not small margins.  
A large reason for the bias seen in these models is the lack of proper subject distribution in 
common training datasets.19 Minorities and women are usually less represented, which leads to 
ML algorithms overemphasizing White men. Joy Buolamwini, the founder of the Algorithmic 
Justice League and leader of the Gender Shades research team, noticed that in the IJB-A, a 
dataset commonly used in facial recognition by governmental bodies, 75.4% of all subjects were 
male, and at least 79% of the subjects had lighter skin.20 ML algorithms learn what they see, 
which makes it no surprise that facial recognition currently performs best on light-skinned men.   
To address the issue of dataset bias, we must consider what an optimized dataset looks like. 
There are general guidelines on how to develop those, which we will not fully outline. The gist is 
that the distribution of subjects by pre-defined group membership should be equal (or close to it) 
for all involved groups, to make sure that the ML model in question does not overemphasize 
certain portions and features of a dataset, as seen in our previous example. 21 22 
2.2.2 Algorithmic Bias 
Part of the ML process is choosing and designing a learning algorithm that takes input datasets 
and learns based on their contents.23 Algorithmic bias is the bias that arises from discrimination 
in the learning algorithm and, eventually the resulting ML model. Algorithmic bias is a broader, 
more general term than dataset bias, in that other factors than the learning algorithm (including 
dataset bias itself) have a direct impact on algorithmic bias.24 Regardless of how solid an 
algorithm is, it can only be as good as the dataset fed to it, and the choices made in defining it. 
These choices may entail deciding on which algorithm is best suited to complete the task in 
question, the weights assigned to the learning algorithm, the structure of the algorithm itself, or 
anything closely related. All of it has an impact on algorithmic bias.25  
 
18 Buolamwini, Joy. “Gender Shades.” Gender Shades, 2018. http://gendershades.org/overview.html. 
19 Buolamwini, Joy A. “Gender Shades: Intersectional Phenotypic and Demographic Evaluation of Face Datasets 
and Gender Classifiers.” MIT Media Lab, 2017, 2017.  
20 Buolamwini, Joy. “Artificial Intelligence Has a Racial and Gender Bias Problem.” Time. Time, February 7, 2019. 
https://time.com/5520558/artificial-intelligence-racial-gender-bias/. 
21 Torralba, Antonio, and Alexei A. Efros. “Unbiased Look at Dataset Bias.” Cvpr 2011, 2011. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2011.5995347. 
22 Deeper Look at Dataset Bias (PDF) 
23 “Machine Learning Crash Course  |  Google Developers.” Google. Google. Accessed March 29, 2020. 
https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/. 
24 Mehrabi, Ninareh, Fred Morstatter, Nripsuta Saxena, Aram Galstyan, and Kristina Lerman. “A Survey on Bias 
and Fairness in Machine Learning.” USC, Information Sciences Institute, September 17, 2019. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3341161.3342915. 
25 Hao, Karen. “This Is How AI Bias Really Happens-and Why It's so Hard to Fix.” MIT Technology Review. MIT 
Technology Review, February 4, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612876/this-is-how-ai-bias-really-
happensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/. 
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2.2.3 Hardware Bias 
Not all bias is software- or data-related. For instance, in the case of Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) positioning (the most famous example of which is GPS), there are small 
deviations when reading phase changes that emerge from bias in hardware (specifically the 
satellite and receiver).26 For this thesis, we will disregard hardware bias. 
2.3 Cognitive Source of Dataset and Algorithmic Bias 
Many of the problems regarding both dataset and algorithmic bias would be thoroughly 
mitigated with some theoretically basic solutions, and extensive research is being made on the 
details of these issues. A year after doing their first audit, the Gender Shades research team did a 
second audit on the same three companies and found that they all had significantly improved the 
performance of their models. Microsoft, for instance, which had a 20.8% difference in 
performance between darker females and lighter males, brought that same number down to 1.5% 
a year later. Face++ and IBM also made significant improvements, although the most 
disadvantaged in the context were still female subjects and those with darker skin. In terms of 
bias directly related to algorithms, improvements are also being made. Recent research has found 
a way to mitigate bias in the algorithms themselves, even with poor datasets. This is done by 
means of latent structure analysis, which allows for the importance of some attributes in training 
datasets to be redistributed and for bias to be reduced as a result.27  
Nevertheless, as we witness improvements, some of the major problems remain. In the second 
audit, Gender Shades also investigated two newer facial recognition models, made by Kairos and 
Amazon respectively. Amazon clearly had the worst performance of all audited models, with a 
31.4% performance difference between darker females and lighter males; almost as 
underwhelming as IBM in 2018.28  
Despite the evident biases, Amazon found it convenient to pitch their software to the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for use in their operations. This is software that 
would more than likely misidentify people of color frequently, leading to unjust arrests. Either 
Amazon was unaware of these biases (which would imply serious negligence), or the company 
simply does not care. Our current societies and economies incentivize the release of unethical 
products due to their profitability, with entities rarely being held accountable. There are 
 
26 Håkansson, Martin. “Hardware biases and their impact on GNSS positioning.”, 2017.  
See also: “What Is GNSS?” European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency, August 29, 2017. 
https://www.gsa.europa.eu/european-gnss/what-gnss. 
27 Amini, Alexander, Ava P. Soleimany, Wilko Schwarting, Sangeeta N. Bhatia, and Daniela Rus. “Uncovering and 
Mitigating Algorithmic Bias through Learned Latent Structure.” Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on 
AI, Ethics, and Society, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3306618.3314243. 
28 Hao, Karen. “Making Face Recognition Less Biased Doesn't Make It Less Scary.” MIT Technology Review. MIT 
Technology Review, February 15, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612846/making-face-recognition-
less-biased-doesnt-make-it-less-scary/. 
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numerous examples, with Cathy O’Neil, Virginia Eubanks and others having written books 
containing many of them (some of which will be covered briefly in this work).29 30 
This brings us to the fundamental problem of bias in supervised ML: cognitive biases.31Although 
dataset and algorithmic biases are concerns, they directly derive from our implicit biases. These 
become apparent in how much we expect from the ML model. How much can it discriminate and 
still be acceptable (or fair)? How lenient can we be in our requirements on data collection? How 
much empirical research do we need before including a feature in our dataset? How confident are 
we that the chosen learning algorithm is the best suited one? Do we understand the algorithm 
well enough to know how it arrives at decisions? And lastly, the question that we hope to 
answer: For which contexts and with which solutions is ML warranted at all? These are only 
some of the questions that should be answered every time ML is deployed and, oftentimes, we 
fail to answer all of them correctly (we will find that sometimes there is no “correct” answer), 
which leads to severe consequences.  
No matter how hard we try to erase these biases, they will remain present. Usually, we do not 
recognize our implicit biases and their significant impacts on outcome. A prime example came 
up in Amazon’s attempt to make a program that would aid in recruiting. It was quickly detected 
that the program was biased against women, which was assumed to be due to women being 
directly used as an assessment variable, or feature, in the program. However, when group 
membership became an excluded feature, the program was still discriminating against women.  
After extensive investigation it was discovered that the program was, unbeknownst to the 
developers, seeing a pattern in resume word usage among men and women respectively, which 
made the program favor men’s resumes. The training set used consisted of resumes from 
successful Amazon employees, most of whom have been male in the past, which skewed the 
results.32  
Initially this seems like a farfetched bias and stereotype but it has empirical evidence behind it.33 
Out of the many factors impacting a complex model, the first thought is rarely to assume that 
word usage is the main contributing factor to bias. It is evident that when faced with multiple 
factors (attributes) to consider (in some cases thousands), humans will be unable to account for 
all of them. For this and other reasons, the thesis will largely be focusing on the human 
limitations that come with ML. The limitations of our programs start and end with us. If our 
 
29 Peterson, Andrea, and Jake Laperruque. “Amazon Pushes ICE to Buy Its Face Recognition Surveillance Tech.” 
The Daily Beast. The Daily Beast Company, October 23, 2018. https://www.thedailybeast.com/amazon-pushes-ice-
to-buy-its-face-recognition-surveillance-tech. 
30 Eubanks, Virginia. Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor. New 
York: Picador, St. Martins Press, 2019. 
31 Turner-Lee, Nicol, Paul Resnick, and Genie Barton. “Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices 
and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms.” Brookings. Brookings, October 25, 2019. 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-
reduce-consumer-harms/. 
32 Dastin, Jeffrey. “Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias against Women.” Reuters. 
Thomson Reuters, October 10, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-
insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G. 
33 Jackson, Abby. “12 Words That Are More Familiar to Women than Men.” Business Insider. Business Insider, 
March 24, 2017. https://www.businessinsider.com/gender-and-vocabulary-analysis-women-2017-3?r=US&IR=T. 
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limitations and flaws are accounted for, doing the same for our ML models will become a 
simpler task.  
In assessing biases, we will mainly be assessing the output, except when discussing the 
interpretability of an algorithm.34Long-term, it is the output of a certain model that defines 
whether the dataset and algorithm were appropriately chosen and deployed. It is by considering 
the output that we can properly assess whether the input data and/or ML technique must be 
improved. This, of course, disregards how understandable the model is to the general public (and 
prioritizes performance ahead of interpretability) but allows us to see how often the models in 
question get things right, regardless of how they arrive at decisions. 
2.4 Inductive and Deductive Reasoning 
We have many ways of classifying the knowledge we receive from ML applications. However, 
conclusions reached based on output from ML algorithms are oftentimes defined by either their 
predictive or descriptive nature.  
Predictive tasks have, as indicated by the name, the goal of predicting outcomes or 
characteristics in future subjects, based on trends and data seen in previous subjects. In more 
technical terms, these tasks assume dependence of certain attributes in datasets on other 
independent attributes and try to make predictions based on the given relationships.35 A more 
well-known application is using historic stock market trends to try to predict future outcomes.36 
Descriptive tasks, on the other hand, try to highlight trends and patterns in data for various useful 
purposes. Different statistical measures, such as clustering or association rule mining, consider 
what attributes have in common and set them apart, and find appropriate ways to present relevant 
conclusions.37  
Although there is much to separate these types of tasks, they have one trait in common: the 
construction of all models related to descriptive and predictive ML tasks are based on inductive 
reasoning. Inductive, or bottom-up reasoning, is the concept of using statements and instances of 
different sorts to provide evidence in support of a certain claim (as opposed to deductive 
reasoning, where we make use of informational input to reach, by way of logical discourse and 
while assuming the truth of the input, fully true conclusions).38 We then apply our inductively 
reasoned models to deduce conclusions about future subjects, or to find patterns within data. 
Both inductive and deductive reasoning have value, but the former can be misinterpreted, 
whereas the latter cannot. Deductive reasoning, if done correctly, leads to what is called 
necessarily true conclusions, which are true regardless of circumstance, so long as the logical 
foundation of the issue in question (as well as the assumptions that accompany them) does not 
 
34 See 4.4. 
35 ”Features” and ”attributes” will be used interchangeably in this work. 
36 Kompella, Subhadra, and Kalyana Chakravarthy Chilukuri. “Stock Market Prediction Using Machine Learning 
Methods.” International Journal Of Computer Engineering And Technology 10, no. 3 (2019). 
https://doi.org/10.34218/ijcet.10.3.2019.003. 
37 Introduction to Data Mining.  
38 Bradford, Alina. “Deductive Reasoning vs. Inductive Reasoning.” LiveScience. Purch, July 25, 2017. 
https://www.livescience.com/21569-deduction-vs-induction.html. 
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change. Inductive reasoning, however, only provides evidence for or against a claim, without 
making it necessarily true. The best inductive reasoning can do is to make certain claims more 
(or less) probable.  
2.4.1 The Problem of Induction 
It is here that the problem of induction comes into play. English philosopher C.D Broad 
famously stated that “induction is the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy.”39 
Posed by many prominent philosophers (including David Hume), the main criticism of inductive 
reasoning is that it can never provide epistemic certainty.40 There will always be parts of the 
inductively reached conclusions that remain incomplete. For this reason, since the deductive 
reasoning applied by ML models is based on inductive reasoning, there will be unaccommodated 
gaps of knowledge in our conclusions.  
The problem of induction targets descriptive and predictive ML tasks in different ways. For 
descriptive tasks, it criticizes that generalization based on patterns seen in data never will provide 
pure knowledge (since we can never assume full truth of the input, or data), even in cases where 
all subjects point to the same classification (which would be considered the best-case scenario). 
For predictive tasks, the criticism is directed toward the impossibility of accurately predicting all 
future outcomes based on previous ones.  
In ML, we rarely encounter best-case scenarios. If we have information that assertively suggests 
a generalization or future outcome, we will likely not use ML to confirm it. We would, for 
instance, not need ML to tell us that the probability of each outcome on a regular, fair-weighted 
die is one-sixth. Although various shapes and designs will have slightly different outcomes 
(engraved dots, for instance, may change the weight distribution of a die), we neglect these 
attributes due to their lack of relevance in the larger scheme of things. Since trial and error has 
given us no reason to think otherwise, we have, through inductive reasoning, concluded that in 
the case of a six-sided die with (relatively) even weight distribution, the respective probabilities 
will remain constant. ML is applied to cases in which the answers are not as obvious.  
Due to this problem of induction, we cannot generalize and, with full certainty, make necessarily 
correct assumptions about outcomes for future subjects, or the attributes by which they are 
assessed. In more technical terms, the answers we get from ML are of a probabilistic, non-
deterministic nature. It is thus unreasonable to expect perfection from our ML models and 
applications. Imperfection is therefore not part of the problem for bias and should not be 
perceived as such. It is the way imperfection is dealt with that becomes the main issue.  
2.5 Justice and Fairness in ML 
Theoretically, the problem of induction suggests that due to the inductive reasoning of ML 
model development, we will find ourselves in situations where not everyone is treated equally by 
the resulting models. This theoretical discrimination will, however, also have a practical impact 
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on people’s lives, which we have seen in previous examples and seek to explore further. In light 
of this issue, the interpretation of what is fair and just becomes relevant. Much of the general 
discussion regarding justice is about how we establish equity, which warrants those same 
discussions taking place in the context of ML. But, before we proceed, we must highlight the 
distinction between justice and fairness.  
These terms are often used interchangeably, although doing so has created confusion in the past, 
as it makes the task of distinguishing between moral obligations, versus considerations, difficult. 
Justice is the moral concept of what is right. Fairness, on the other hand, is the personal 
evaluation of justice. As Goldman and Cropanzano state, ““Justice” denotes the conduct that is 
morally required, whereas “fairness” denotes an evaluative judgment as to whether this conduct 
is morally praiseworthy.” 41 In this sense, justice is a concept independent of fairness, in that it 
can exist without satisfying fairness. This does not, however, necessarily mean that we have 
access to this definition of justice, but even if we did, it would be difficult to attain due to our 
biased evaluations.  The question then becomes to what extent we can accommodate fairness, 
while having solid considerations for ML justice. We will clarify the reason(s) for this specific 
approach in the coming sections.42 
2.6 Full Accommodation of Fairness in ML 
In situations of complete consensus, we seem to be less concerned with investigating whether an 
outcome is fair. In these instances, we assume that since every individual in question has the 
same definition of fairness, that the outcome indeed must be fair. Unfortunately, this best-case 
scenario is almost never a reality – especially when we have many people with different 
backgrounds involved (which oftentimes applies to ML). The question then becomes: “In 
situations of disagreement, is there a way for ML to accommodate everyone’s fairness 
definitions?” One can argue that some fairness definitions are bad and that some are good, but 
completing such assessments would require one to make assumptions beyond what we know to 
be necessarily true. For that reason, taking an approach which does not intend to accommodate 
all definitions of fairness is selective without justification. 
Nonetheless, the answer to this question has its foundation in whether one finds fairness 
subjective or objective. If we find that fairness is objective, we should only look to account for 
what is objectively fair and just. However, by the definition used in 2.5, fairness is the personal 
evaluation of justice, which is a subjective concept. This means, in turn, that any disagreement 
on what fair course of action is would imply that fairness is not fully accommodated in that 
instance (we believe most people encounter such situations frequently). This would consequently 
apply to ML, as any approach to accommodate fairness (or any disagreement with such 
approach) would only be a personal evaluation of what is considered just, and not necessarily 
what is actually just. Therefore, regardless of situation and how close to perfect an application is, 
there will be instances of unfairness due to us having different definitions of what is fair. In other 
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words – no, we cannot accommodate everyone with one singular solution – with or without ML 
models. This should, however, not stop us from trying to optimize our conditions.  
When we discuss fairness, we often discuss equality. It may sound like a simple measure of 
fairness, and sometimes, that may be true. But, what do we exactly mean by equality? Is it the 
equality of goods? The equality of opportunity? The equality of treatment? Ronald Dworkin 
explored this topic in his two essays, “The Equality of Welfare” and “The Equality of 
Resources”. He discovered that equality oftentimes is not what we are looking for. Equality, just 
for the sake of it, is counterproductive and unethical.43 Assuming limited resources, what point is 
there in providing insulin for someone who does not have diabetes?  
Although it is much more difficult to define, as it requires us to consider the diversity of 
perspective and needs, the concept of equity has taken precedence over equality. For our 
purposes, we will define equity as “giving everyone what they need to be successful” moving 
forward. 44 
Sometimes, equity and some type of equality mean the same thing. Sometimes, giving everyone 
what they need to be successful implies treating everyone the same, or giving everyone the same 
opportunity. When we discuss access to human rights, this is often the case. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, states that “the inherent dignity and […] the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world.”45 However, for situations in which equality is not equity, there are 
disagreements on what decisions would be considered fair, which most certainly becomes 
relevant in the application of ML. All these concerns will help set the foundation for justice in 
our framework of ML implementation considerations.  
2.7 Problem Statement 
In the previous sections, we have discussed the presence of bias, the nature of it, and the reasons 
as to why it inevitably impacts fairness and justice in our societies. In our attempts to address 
these problems, we often ask how and when we can ethically use ML. However, we rarely ask 
whether it is ethically justified to implement ML models to complete tasks in certain contexts. 
The questions of “how” and “when” to ethically use a certain application of ML are dependent 
on the existence of an affirmative answer to the question of “whether”. 
Some tasks cannot be ethically completed in certain contexts, which will become evident in 
some of the examples mentioned below.46 Another problem is that we oftentimes focus on the 
performance of a task, rather than the context in which a task is being performed. We tend to 
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assume that the implementation is wrong and that it could be remedied. This is not always the 
case.  
To address these issues, we have tasked ourselves with developing a framework that will 
consider the current problems of fairness and justice in ML, along with the evident technological 
and cognitive bias limitations, to give recommendations on whether implementation of ML is 
warranted in a given context, with a given ML model. In doing so, the framework also intends to 
set expectation standards for ML, both pre- and post-implementation. We hope that this will 
encourage more self-awareness in programmers and users of ML technology about the impact of 
their actions, but also optimism about the potential for societal and technological improvement.  
The framework in question will be assuming liberalism as deployed in most Western countries as 
the pursued virtue. This means that values such as freedom of choice, separateness of persons 
and theoretical impartiality will be commonly encountered themes. This is a reasonable approach 
for a general framework, as the theoretical ambition should not be set any lower than full 
accommodation for all individuals. Now, with a set foundation of background knowledge, we 
consider the current situation before commencing the development of the framework. 
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3 Current State of the Field 
 
3.1 Fairness Verification 
As the problem of fairness in ML has been increasingly highlighted publicly, measures have 
been taken to actively assess how well applications account for fairness. At the University of 
Wisconsin – Madison, a team of researchers have worked on a bias verification program called 
FairSquare, which is a mathematical approach to assessing bias presence. The gist of the practice 
is to assume a certain fairness criterion, defined by mathematical constraints, and check to see 
whether a program is successfully fulfilling that criterion.47Assuming that the fairness criteria are 
“correct”, this is a truly helpful practice to ensure less biased software use. Nevertheless, there 
are many situations in which we are not certain about the “right” definition of fairness; likely 
because our definitions almost never are fully fair, and much less so when we attempt to model 
them mathematically (which is the case with ML). In the coming paragraphs, we will outline the 
problems with our current definitions of fairness from most to least critical.  
3.2 Non-Empirical Feedback Loops 
A common problem in ML regards the features by which a ML model attempts to complete a 
task or answer a question. It is common for governmental entities to occasionally include 
attributes in their datasets that have no empirically shown correlation with the attempted 
classification. The TSA has, for instance, received criticism for discriminating against Muslim 
subjects by using biased attributes.48 49 
In the worst scenarios, we take those wrongfully included features and draw erroneous 
conclusions about what their contribution to a certain result should tell us.  We accept results 
without confirming their proper function. In Washington, D.C during the 2008 recession, for 
instance, the city administration started assessing teacher performance using a ML program 
called IMPACT. This program was to make decisions on which teachers to hold responsible (and 
release) for poor learning results among students in the district. The program was responsible for 
50 percent of the assessment for each subject. Although the program’s features were not revealed 
to the public, the results surprised many, as some of the top-rated teachers in the district (as 
judged by administrators and parents) received the lowest performance scores overall and were 
fired as a result. It became evident that one of the higher weighted features of IMPACT was 
changes in standardized test scores for students, from year to year. USA Today later also 
discovered that there was a significant level of erasures on the standardized tests assessed at 
many of the schools in the district (almost a fourth of them, specifically). This implied cheating 
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by students, and possibly teachers allowing them to check their own answers. In the 
investigations, teachers were not asked if they contributed to this high level of erasure 
(specifically wrong-to-right answers). 50 And, the teachers who were fired never received 
explanations as to how IMPACT arrived at their low scores.  
IMPACT assumed that better grades implies more learning, which there is no general empirical 
evidence for (it may apply in certain schools, but not all). This is what O’Neil refers to as a 
“WMD [Weapon of Math Destruction] feedback loop”, which accepts a ML model arriving at 
the right answer without having empirical backing. O’Neil discusses a more general example:  
Employers, for example, are increasingly using credit scores to evaluate potential hires. 
Those who pay their bills promptly, the thinking goes, are more likely to show up to work 
on time and follow the rules. In fact, there are plenty of responsible people and good 
workers who suffer misfortune and see their credit scores fall. But the belief that bad 
credit correlates with bad job performance leaves those with low scores less likely to find 
work. Joblessness pushes them toward poverty, which further worsens their scores, 
making it even harder for them to land a job. It’s a downward spiral. And employers 
never learn how many good employees they’ve missed out on by focusing on credit 
scores.51 
Usually, we assess the success of a classification task by considering misclassification rates. 
These answer the question: “A posteriori, how often did the model get things right?” In the 
examples seen above, this question cannot be answered as there is no misclassification rate to 
consider. We do not know how many times we got things wrong, which acts as positive 
reinforcement for the developers and users; all they know is that it gets some job done.  
3.3 Current Fairness Criteria 
There are three approaches currently used with intention to maximize fairness in our ML models. 
These are anti-classification, classification parity and calibration. Corbett-Davies and Goel 
(2018) did a comprehensive analysis of the potential flaws that each approach may have.52 We 
will analyze the effectiveness of these using the example of a program called COMPAS, 
developed in 2016, which assigns inmates recidivism risk scores for sentencing by considering 
more than 100 different factors that supposedly play a role in an inmate’s probability of 
reoffending. Its outcomes were passionately discussed after its implementation, which has made 
for increased statistical availability.  
3.3.1 Anti-Classification 
Anti-classification disregards which pre-defined group (such as ethnicity or sex) one belongs to, 
with the intention of not having that impact the result of the model. In other words, pre-defined 
group membership is not considered a feature of the developed ML model. However, although 
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this approach has good intentions, anti-classification could have an adverse effect if 
classifications are disregarded.  
For instance, results show that it is inevitable that COMPAS will discriminate against women if 
anti-classification is enforced. Without considering the classification of the subjects in question, 
women are assigned significantly higher risk scores for the same subject recidivism rates. In 
other words, this implies that women who do not recommit crimes are given harder treatment by 
the ML model (and – in turn – the courts) if the assessment does not directly consider the 
subject’s gender. This is due to implicit biases of our data inevitably leading to our learning 
algorithms catching patterns indirectly related to group membership, changing the treatment of 
certain subjects accordingly.  
Usually, we do not recognize our implicit biases and their significant impacts on outcome. This 
is the danger with anti-classification. The aforementioned Amazon recruitment system is enough 
evidence that anti-classification does not mean anti-discrimination.53 
3.3.2 Classification Parity 
Classification parity is the approach that intentionally regards group membership and ensures 
that the evaluation measure for each subject’s performance is equalized across the relevant 
groups. This uses confusion matrices – a concept commonly used in ML to determine how often 
a model classifies correctly – for each pre-defined group classification to assess how well the 
ML model in question works (usually by considering metrics such as precision and false positive 
rates) and to equalize in accordance.   
The problem with classification parity is that our measures of risk distribution will be different 
for every relevant group classification. In that regard, if we make decisions on relevance based 
on a single threshold for all groups, we are not exercising classification parity (as there will be 
disparity in how each group is treated, based on their respective risk distribution). The solution is 
to assign a different threshold for each group that accounts for the relative risk distributions of 
each classification. When this approach is taken, however, we see large differences in optimal 
thresholds for different demographics, meaning that classification parity also could result in 
some demographics being significantly more roughly treated than others. For COMPAS, 
regardless of whether one wanted to minimize recidivism or achieve most equal treatment across 
all relevant groups, this resulted in a 16-17% optimal threshold for Black subjects (meaning that 
less than a fifth of Black subjects would have high enough risk scores to be detained), compared 
to 31% for White subjects – a significant difference (which will be discussed briefly later).54 
With classification parity, it is also difficult to know whether the problem is actual 
discrimination or underlying problems that lead to the impression of discrimination. In some 
situations, the possibility exists that the risk distribution that results for a certain group is close to 
true, but that vast disparities give us reason to believe that the distribution is biased. 
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Classification parity disregards this possibility by reasoning that bias must always be accounted 
for by equating subjects by group membership, when this is not always the case.  
3.3.3 Calibration 
Calibration is a tool used to ensure that the predictions of a certain model align well with actual 
outcomes (and that if they do not, that the model gets “calibrated” accordingly). In other words, 
it sets a standard for what the risk score in question is supposed to mean across all subjects. 
Thus, calibration implies that the same predicted classifications for two different groups should 
mean the same (or very similar) thing in real life and modifies the model until that is the case. 
Calibration for COMPAS, for instance, would mean that the same risk score for two subjects of 
different groups would imply the same recidivism rates for those respective groups.  
One problem with calibration is its susceptibility to direct discrimination.55 Redlining (that is, the 
systematic approach taken by governmental entities to limit resources for minority communities), 
for instance, has been heavily associated with calibration, in that it allows the modification of 
each subject’s risk score to gather around a distribution that is less beneficial for a certain 
group.56 The flexibility provided by calibration also oftentimes implies that standards are a non-
necessity in the context, which defeats the point of one of our current objectives – to set a 
standard for what fairness looks like in ML.  
3.4 Mutual Exclusivity of Fairness Criteria 
As pointed out, all currently used mathematical definitions of fairness have their respective 
biases. One may then wonder about the possibilities of combining the strengths of all three 
measures to account for all their flaws. It turns out that this is oftentimes impossible. 
There are instances in which two or more different criteria, which all cover legitimate concerns 
and most likely should contribute to the scenario’s holistic definition of fairness, contradict one 
another mathematically. The reason COMPAS became a topic of discussion was because of the 
disagreements in what was considered fair.  
Race was not one of the features, meaning that the program developer, Northpointe, was 
exercising anti-classification with COMPAS. On the one hand, Northpointe correctly argued that 
COMPAS was accurate in its assessment ( “defendants assigned the highest risk score 
reoffended at almost four times the rate as those assigned the lowest score”), and that the 
program achieved this without considering race. On the other hand, news organization 
ProPublica accurately claimed that the program treated Black people who did not recommit 
crimes rougher than White people in the same category (on average, Black people in this 
category were given a risk score twice as high).57 
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We could argue that both Northpointe and ProPublica’s perspectives should be part of the 
holistic fairness definition and be included in the program’s assessment. Race should, by our 
moral measures, likely not be an attribute of the program, and Black people who do not reoffend 
should not be considered higher risk than White people in the same category. However, based on 
a mathematical analysis of the program, COMPAS would be unable to achieve the constraints set 
out by both companies. Fulfilling one fairness criterion would require us to exclude the other 
fairness criterion, making it mathematically impossible to achieve mutual inclusivity of all 
fairness criteria in the case of COMPAS. It becomes evident that if this is a reality for one ML 
model, that it is a possibility for others as well. This example points out the shortcomings of 
mathematical models in achieving what we would consider fully fair outcomes.  
3.5 Theoretical Versus Empirical Observations  
Theoretically, the problem of induction already implied that ML would not be able to achieve 
full accommodation of fairness.58 Now, we have seen empirical evidence in support of that 
claim. No matter how hard we try, perfection will never exist in ML, and for that reason, it 
should never be the expectation. Our task is to develop a framework that accounts for both 
theoretical and practical limitations and sets a standard for the expectations that should be placed 
on ML models and tasks we hope to solve.  
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4 Development of Framework 
 
We have now established the difficulties of fully accommodating fairness, and thus establishing 
equity. Thus, it is of importance to emphasize solutions that aim to maximize the parts of fairness 
we define (or should define) similarly (we will elaborate on this in 4.1).  
For proper application of the framework, three input objects must be defined:  
1. The task to be solved 
2. The ML model by which the task is to be completed 
3. The implementation context of the task 
The considerations of the framework will not be discussed in the order that they are addressed in 
the framework itself; that order is established for our convenience in our condensed flowchart 
representation.59 As seen in above-mentioned examples, the definition of optimal distribution 
(for establishing equity) is the main question that remains unanswered in supervised ML tasks. 
We will begin by addressing that question, and see if our answer resembles any of the previously 
outlined criteria of fairness currently used in ML.  
4.1 Distributive Justice 
The question of optimal distribution raises the concept of distributive justice, which is the branch 
of justice that concerns itself with the just distribution of goods – both tangible 
(products/materials) and non-tangible (services).  
The problem in ML is often the distribution of mistakes. For reasons that require no explanation, 
the discrimination against women and dark skin as seen in Gender Shades is a prime example of 
distributive injustice in ML.60 The question then becomes: “What would constitute distributive 
justice in this and any other supervised learning context?” John Rawls can help us set a 
foundation.  
4.1.1 John Rawls’ Justice as Fairness  
Since fairness looks different to every individual, based on their respective nature and nurture, 
we want to consider philosophical theories that account for the separateness and biases of 
individuals, and allow us to set an objective standard for distributive justice. We also want to 
explore the extent to which we can find consensus despite the biases we have regarding fairness. 
Rawls recognized the presence of human bias and thought of ways to theoretically mitigate its 
effects on our definitions of justice.  
In A Theory of Justice (1972), John Rawls introduces theories on what distributive justice should 
look like to a reasonable human being. In other words, Rawls describes the foundation of 
distributive justice, by outlining what everyone, regardless of personal preferences and 
definitions of fairness, can (or should) agree on. The conclusions he reaches are independent of 
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virtue, or the common good – they are focused on justice. He calls the theory “Justice as 
Fairness.”61 
In his work, Rawls famously describes the concept of the original position; a thought experiment 
that assumes what is called a veil of ignorance. A veil of ignorance is the concept of removing 
the partial human characteristics of the individuals/parties in question, thus rendering decision 
making as impartial as possible. Rawls makes the case that this theoretical impartiality will aid in 
establishing the foundation of justice, since one would make decisions knowing nothing about 
oneself or other individuals. In summary, the original position is the one all people would 
(theoretically) take, had they not known anything about themselves or others, and should 
therefore be used as the foundation of distributive justice.  
In exploring this position of supposed complete impartiality, Rawls comes up with two basic 
principles of justice that he considers applicable, regardless of one’s biased stance on fairness. In 
his 1985 book Political Liberalism, where he refines some of the arguments made in A Theory of 
Justice, he describes these as follows:  
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, 
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political 
liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value [liberty principle]. 
 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to 
positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [fair equality of 
opportunity principle]; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society [difference principle].  
Rawls makes a strong case for all, claiming that from the original position, these are conditions 
all reasonable individuals would want for themselves and others. He also notes that a) takes 
precedence over b), should these two interfere.62 
Rawls claims that all reasonable individuals, regardless of their backgrounds and outlooks on the 
common good, would be inclined to agree with the abovementioned principles, due to what he 
calls overlapping consensus. He defines a reasonable individual as someone who is willing to 
work with other individuals in their respective societies to reach mutual agreements that fairly 
accommodate all.63 
His ideas of overlapping consensus are derived from Immanuel Kant’s concept of the categorical 
imperative, which claims that reason within each individual allows us, by logical discourse, to 
arrive at some principles of morality that are applicable to all, regardless of one’s views in regard 
to everything else.64 Rawls makes the case that his outlined argument in “Justice as Fairness” is 
as far as we can go in establishing the categorical imperative from a societal standpoint.65 
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In establishing the difference principle, Rawls recognizes the distinction between equality and 
equity, and that not all individuals from the beginning of time recognize unconditional equality 
as the best definition of fairness. This is also part of Rawls’ Pareto argument for inequality, 
which makes the claim that inequality is virtue if it benefits everyone in the context.66 He points 
out that sometimes, regardless of how conscientious we are in accommodating fairness, we will 
have inequalities. In those cases, he claims that such inequalities should favor “the least 
advantaged.”67 
Rawls’ theories were mainly intended for optimizing societal structures to accommodate 
endeavors of all individuals. Nevertheless, the goods produced by our societies that directly 
affect individuals should also reflect the values by which these societal structures are established. 
In other words, if we have goods produced by the market that limit enforcements of the “basic 
structures of society”, that is a problem.  For that reason, the same societal structures developed 
by Rawls are also applicable to ML and its respective operations.  
4.1.1.1 Choice of Fairness Criteria 
From this, one could assume that Rawls likely would prefer the approach of classification parity 
to the other two, as the inequality in question will often favor what we consider to be the least 
advantaged group (with COMPAS for instance, we could strongly argue that Black people are 
less advantaged in Western societies than White people).68 The important question to answer, 
regardless of situation, is if the solution in question favors what we consider to be the least 
advantaged in the context of the issue.  
One major weakness of Rawls’ discourse: he never confidently defines the least advantaged. 
This is especially a weakness since we would need to properly identify the least advantaged for 
classification parity to fulfill the requirements of Rawls’ justice principles. He does describe the 
potential traits of a relatively disadvantaged person (most of which focused on social and 
economic class differences) but does not go onto introducing a formal definition. In a later paper, 
he changes his description of the least advantaged individuals, and characterizes them by how 
undeserving people are of the position they are in. His description begs the question: “Is this 
individual better or worse off, based on the initial conditions that they were given?”69 There are 
weaknesses in both descriptions, but moving forward, we will assume that the definition of “the 
least advantaged” is sufficiently accounted for and that the hypothetical context of the ML model 
implementation makes it possible to accurately define the least advantaged group of individuals.  
One can also argue the extent to which inequality between groups can be considered acceptable, 
even in the case of favoring the least advantaged (and thus abiding by Rawls’ difference 
principle). With classification parity, both commonly used measures of parity (demographic 
parity and utility-maximizing equalization of false positives) resulted in a 16-17% threshold for 
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Black people and 31% for White people, meaning that the treatment of White people would be 
almost twice as rough.70 Whether this is acceptable should be seriously discussed.  
Finally, the problem previously mentioned in the outlining of classification parity persists.71 
Sometimes, in a particular context, people may not actually be discriminated against. It may be 
simply the reality of the situation. Rawls would likely argue that we may have been led to this 
reality due to discrimination in other contexts of life. For instance, if we were to assume that 
significantly more crimes are being committed in poorer neighborhoods, the fact that some 
individuals are poor sometimes warrants no other action. Rawls would claim that we counteract 
the “negative” discriminations in our societies by enforcing “positive” discriminations where it is 
not possible to have equality of opportunity.  
4.1.1.2 Other Concerns  
Some will make the case that the difference principle is utilitarian. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
specifies in detail how his philosophy differs from utilitarianism. An important part of the 
difference principle is that it was not suggested with the intention to maximize utility; it was 
suggested because it was logically derived from the original position, and still takes into account 
the separateness of persons (something utilitarianism does not). G.A Cohen, an analytical 
Marxist, provided an extensive critique of the same principle, although there are other 
philosophers who claim that the difference between the two is not their stances on egalitarianism, 
but more the way they seek to achieve it.72 
It becomes evident that other people may arrive at different conclusions than Rawls – even when 
considering the original position – which confirms that bias is not fully removed even with a veil 
of ignorance. Some of Rawls’ conclusions, for instance, were reached while implying that 
humans will always put their own needs and desires first (which, if we consider the original 
position, he could not have known). Nevertheless, he is one of few to have fully expressed his 
thoughts and attempted to apply deontology, to its possible extent, to a consequentialist reality. 
For this reason, for a first attempt, Rawls’ principles seemed to be the best by which to develop 
the distributive justice considerations of this framework. This does not ever mean that his (or 
our) framework is free from flaws.  
Knowing that this definition of distributive justice is not carved in stone, it is essential that John 
Rawls’ ideas are treated as merely a starting point for distributive justice. His approach is 
deontological, which makes for a difficult practical application, but gives an idea of what we 
theoretically should consider fairness. His claims are basic, since that is only as far as one can go 
without making further assumptions about the specific task and model at hand. Nevertheless, 
those hypotheticals will always exist, which requires us to deal with them. Therefore, this is a 
framework of considerations and not criteria (as it is immensely difficult to deal with the 
hypotheticals of each specific scenario in a general framework). The models in question must be 
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evaluated with the context of their respective applications in mind (the situation specificity of 
each solution will be partly addressed in 4.3). 
4.1.2.1 Considerations 
So, the above analysis suggests this consideration for the framework: 
CONSIDERATION: Does the model in question fulfill the defined requirements of distributive 
justice?  
For this consideration, three questions must be answered about the solution in question, to 
address the three principles of distributive justice put forth by Rawls:  
SUBCONSIDERATION 1: Does the model allow each individual equal rights and liberties? 
If no, then we do not have distributive justice as defined by Rawls. If yes, proceed to 2).  
SUBCONSIDERATION 2: Does the model allow each individual equal opportunity in the 
context of its application?  
If no, proceed to 3). If yes, 3) need not be considered and we have distributive justice as defined 
by Rawls.  
SUBCONSIDERATION 3: Does potential inequality favor the least advantaged of the involved 
groups? 
If no, then we do not have distributive justice as defined by Rawls. Otherwise, we do.  
In a sense, subconsideration 3 is a type of compensatory justice. However, there are more aspects 
of compensation to consider in the context of ML.  
4.2 Compensatory Justice 
Compensatory justice concerns itself with ensuring that subjects are properly compensated for 
unfair disadvantages. Let us assume that we achieve distributive justice as described above. 
Now, further assume that one is part of the subset that the ML model still works against. As 
previously mentioned, due to the problem of induction, ML will never yield perfect results. 
Regardless of how well a model is implemented, there will always exist individuals who get 
unfairly excluded from the applicability of the model in question. In other words, although a ML 
model may avoid discriminating against groups, it may still discriminate against certain 
individuals who are considered anomalies, or outliers. It is of utmost importance that these 
outliers are not punished for the shortcomings of the model, and that the entities who choose to 
deploy these models compensate accordingly.  
In ML, this is a prevalent problem. In her book Automating Inequality (2018), Virginia Eubanks 
explores scenarios in which the application of automation had undesirable effects.  One of the 
cases in question had a program make decisions on welfare distribution to individuals in Indiana, 
which resulted in terrible outcomes for many individuals. One million citizens had benefits 
denied during the first three years of implementation, 54% more denials than the three years 
prior to implementation. One specific case that gained attention was that of Omega Young, who 
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in late 2008 had her benefits revoked for not having booked an appointment, due to her being in 
the hospital getting treated for cancer. The automated system interpreted this as a “failure to 
cooperate.” Young died less than a year later due to her disease complications.73 In this case, the 
system generalized its decision-making, based on the assumption that most people who fail to 
book an appointment do not have a good enough reason to do so. Omega Young was an 
unperceived outlier who had done nothing wrong.  
The concept of compensatory justice ensures that there are ways to accommodate situations like 
that of Omega Young. It ensures that in the case of classification anomalies, the individuals in 
question do not get unjustly punished. So, in ML, compensatory justice would be established 
when, even though we may have theoretical discrimination against individuals by the model, 
there are failsafe ways of ensuring that this is redressed, and the practical outcome is equitable. 
In Young’s case, compensatory justice could be ensuring that high-risk decisions are double-
checked by a human worker, or that outlier detection is used to have certain decisions never be 
made by a ML model to begin with.  
4.2.1.1 Considerations 
Thus, the next consideration: 
CONSIDERATION: Does the model in question fulfill the defined requirements of compensatory 
justice?  
For this consideration, only one question must be answered:  
SUBCONSIDERATION: In the case of theoretical discrimination against individuals by the 
model, does the developer have failsafe ways of ensuring that the practical outcome is equitable? 
If the answer is yes, we have compensatory justice. Otherwise, we do not.  
4.3 Moral Evaluation 
Theoretically, we have now established the definitions and considerations of distributive and 
compensatory justice respectively. It is obvious, however, that determining whether these are 
carried out in practice is a more difficult task due to our differing moral views and limitations in 
distancing ourselves from our biases. As 18th century philosopher and economist Adam Smith 
wrote in his Theory of Moral Sentiments: 
There are some situations which bear so hard upon human nature that the greatest degree 
of self-government, which can belong to so imperfect a creature as man, is not able to 
stifle, altogether, the voice of human weakness, or reduce the violence of the passions to 
that pitch of moderation, in which the impartial spectator can entirely enter into them.74  
 
73 Edes, Alyssa, and Emma Bowman. “'Automating Inequality': Algorithms In Public Services Often Fail The Most 
Vulnerable.” NPR. NPR, February 19, 2018. 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/02/19/586387119/automating-inequality-algorithms-in-public-
services-often-fail-the-most-vulnerab. 
74 Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Clarendon, 1759. 
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With certainty, we can say that ML falls into this category of situation. So, how do we make 
these decisions? How do we deal with biases in ML, knowing that they will be present in some 
shape or form regardless of how hard we try to eliminate them? How do we optimize the 
mitigation of these biases, considering the diversity of views that must be considered? These are 
the questions moral evaluation theories try to answer, both for individuals and collectives. 
Smith’s impartial spectator theory is one worth considering. 
4.3.1 Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator 
Smith strongly believed that our implicit biases cloud our judgment in specific situations. He 
believed that these biases ignite feelings in us, which inevitably lead us to act with emotion and 
not logic. He did, however, have some thoughts on how certain mindsets could partially remedy 
the influence of bias. In the previously outlined quote, Smith mentioned an “impartial spectator”, 
which he claims is the mindset by which individuals can distance themselves from their biases 
most efficiently. The impartial spectator is a mindset in the form of a theoretical person, who can 
assess the situation by considering the perspectives of everyone involved. He believed that by 
distancing oneself from one’s individual feelings about a certain situation, one could reach more 
sound conclusions on reasonable courses of action.  
As mentioned, the impartial spectator is theoretical and has abilities beyond what humans are 
capable of. This was highlighted in the previously outlined quotation. Smith continues, however, 
by stating that one may make a serious attempt to emulate the abilities of the impartial spectator 
by optimizing in the presence of human limitations:  
Though in those cases, therefore, the behaviour of the sufferer fall short of the most 
perfect propriety, it may still deserve some applause, and even in a certain sense, may be 
denominated virtuous. It may still manifest an effort of generosity and magnanimity of 
which the greater part of men are incapable; and though it fails of absolute perfection, it 
may be a much nearer approximation towards perfection, than what, upon such trying 
occasions, is commonly either to be found or to be expected.75 
Adam Smith discussed, in short, how to at least attempt to optimize conditions by trying to take 
the perspectives of all into consideration. Smith claims that regardless of whether we are 
considering real-world or hypothetical conditions, the “presence of the impartial spectator, the 
authority of the man within the breast, is always at hand to overawe them into the proper tone 
and temper of moderation.”76  
The strength of Smith’s impartial spectator model is that it is not merely theoretical. Research 
has been done on how to enforce it empirically, especially in professional settings.77 There is, 
however, only an extent to which his theories can be carried out in practice. Nevertheless, 
Smith’s views emphasize how we can consciously admit our biases and do everything in our 
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power to mitigate them by means of moral evaluation beyond ourselves. For this reason, we must 
try to emulate the impartial spectator in our process of assessing the sufficiency of ML models. 
Based on his writings on the limitations of human beings, it is also reasonable to believe that 
Smith would agree that an actual impartial spectator of a specific scenario would be more 
proficient in assessing its fairness, as opposed to subjects who themselves are directly involved. 
This warrants the discussion of algorithmic auditing. 
4.3.2 Algorithmic Auditing 
Algorithmic auditing is the process by which an algorithm and its respective impact are assessed. 
There is no unequivocal template to consider in completing this audit, although Smith’s impartial 
spectator implies that analyzing the direct impact on the people involved should be the main 
priority in assessing our models. After all, his entire moral evaluation argument regards our lack 
of empathy, and that actions should be taken to improve our abilities in that respect.  
Cathy O’Neil (the author of Weapons of Math Destruction) has started her own company, 
ORCAA (O’Neil Risk Consulting & Algorithmic Auditing), which primarily focuses on “the 
people who will be impacted by the algorithm’s success or failure”, and makes an assessment of 
the risks associated with the impact on those groups.78 One of the tools ORCAA uses in auditing 
algorithms and assessing their respective impacts is an ethical matrix.79 This assessment 
apparatus is used, oftentimes in collaboration with affected groups, to render reasonable 
conclusions on what is considered fair in the specific context. The “respect for justice” principles 
of the ethical matrix are also developed specifically with John Rawls’ fairness definitions in 
mind, which makes this approach a suitable fit for our purposes.80 
It is necessary that the auditors be some of the very best computer scientists and programmers in 
the field. The difficulties of assessing the weaknesses of a previously unencountered complex 
algorithm will become evident otherwise, as these are developed by some of the most proficient 
programmers in the world. It is important that when full transparency is offered by the audited 
entity, that the auditor itself fully understands the process and implications.  
We do not directly endorse ORCAA’s approach to algorithmic auditing, as there may be other 
approaches that better emulate the impartial spectator theory (however, we have not found one). 
We are also not including any directly defined considerations in the framework for moral 
evaluation, as this mentality should be encouraged throughout the process and not in a specific 
portion of the framework. We realize the necessity of algorithmic auditing in future practices of 
ML implementation, and hope that it becomes common practice for all entities soon.  
4.4 Freedom of Choice 
There are situations in which distributive and compensatory justice are not necessarily accounted 
for by ML, yet one may still consider it to be the best solution to the problem available. If a 
cancer patient is told that there is an ML assessment tool that discriminates in performance 
 
78 “ORCAA.” ORCAA. Accessed March 29, 2020. https://orcaarisk.com/. 
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against minorities, but that still performs much better than any physician’s diagnosis, one may 
still want to consider it. It becomes a question of whether one would want to forego the 
importance of distributive and compensatory justice for the sake of contextual performance. This 
would not be an easy decision to make, as one may trust one’s own physician more than any 
statistical advantage a ML model can provide, but that is the point – the decision should not be 
made for the subject, but by the subject. Thus, we must consider the impact freedom of choice 
has in different scenarios of ML implementation. 
There are mainly two questions of freedom of choice that must be answered for us to get the full 
scope: 
(1) “Can the task in question be avoided altogether?” and  
(2) “Are there other non-ML alternatives to completing the task in question?” 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2 respectively will address these questions, as well as the reasons for which they 
must be answered. 
4.4.1 Choice of Task Avoidance 
Throughout this work, the emphasis has been people and the severity of impact on their lives as a 
result of how some tasks are pursued. Eventually, this framework is developed for the betterment 
of human wellbeing. For this reason, the framework needs to ensure that the context of a 
situation is accounted for and that increased caution is advised for certain situations.  
Then, one may ask which circumstances warrant additional caution and restriction. One way to 
approach this question is to define tasks that must be addressed for the survival of the individual 
in question and can therefore not be avoided. Here, Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs can 
help us define when we should be increasingly conscientious about our ML applications. 
Maslow, a prominent 20th century psychologist attempted in his Theory of Human Motivation 
(1943) to define our needs by their necessity. He did so to emphasize the source of motivation in 
human beings, but his hierarchy is applicable in many contexts.81 In the context of ML, we must 
ensure that more good is done than harm, and that in the event of failure we ensure that negative 
consequences are not beyond what we would consider reasonable. Below is a visual of Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs: 
 
81 Maslow, Abraham H. Theory of Human Motivation. S.l.: Wilder Publications, 2018. 
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Figure 4: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. 82 
The case we make in using the hierarchy for our ML framework, is that tasks included in the first 
two steps of Maslow’s hierarchy are tasks one does not have the choice to escape. One’s survival 
is dependent on physiological needs, which in turn are dependent on the mentioned safety needs. 
Long-term, without attending to our physiological and safety needs, we die. Thus, we must 
ensure that decisions made by ML models about these needs are taken very seriously. For the 
remainder of this work, we will refer to those two first steps of the hierarchy as “life-defining 
needs”. 
We do have our respective objections to Maslow’s hierarchy. For one, sex cannot reasonably be 
considered a physiological need in the way food and sleep are. Simply put, one will not die 
without sex. In addition, sexual intimacy is already accounted for in the love/belonging stage. 
Second, for the purpose of ML application, mental health should be included in the safety stage. 
Maslow would reasonably justify the exclusion of mental health as the entire pyramid intends to 
address that aspect of human beings. Nevertheless, for the purpose of our framework, it is of 
essence that mental health is considered and should likely be placed in the safety need step of the 
hierarchy. 
4.4.1.1 Considerations 
The first consideration of our framework flowchart (as this will be considered before the 
considerations on distributive and compensatory justice) then becomes the following:  
CONSIDERATION: Is this model making decisions on life-defining needs?  
4.4.2 Choice of Non-ML Alternatives 
Now that we have properly defined what constitutes a task for which the choice exists to avoid it 
altogether, we must consider scenarios in which the task itself is not as vital. This question is 
 
82 McLeod, Saul. “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs in pyramid form with explanations and examples.” Simply 
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important to consider, as it helps us define appropriate expectations on distributive and 
compensatory justice for different scenarios, but also the understanding the public should have of 
an algorithm. Now, the central question becomes whether there is a choice in completing the task 
by other means than ML. The reason we explicitly ask for the existence of non-ML alternatives, 
is due to the assumption that unless a solution is of ML nature it will, at the very least, be 
interpretable.83 That is, the rationale by which the decision was made will be understandable and 
that if it is not, there will be full accountability for the mistakes made. For instance, in the case of 
a physician’s recommendation, we always expect a reason as to why they have arrived at a 
specific recommendation. In ML, we will not always have a fully outlined rationale. So, these 
are the three scenarios to consider: 
4.4.2.1 Life-Defining Need Without Non-ML Alternatives  
This is the scenario in which we must be most cautious about interpretability and justice 
requirements. If the task regards a life-defining need, there is no escaping its completion. 
Furthermore, if one does not have non-ML alternatives to consult, then the task must be 
completed exactly as outlined by the model considered by the framework, or some other ML 
model that the framework has deemed inferior. For this reason, it is required that our model 
fulfills the recommendations of compensatory and distributive justice, but also that there is 
interpretability.  
4.4.2.2 Life-Defining Need With Non-ML Alternatives  
Here, the recommendations on distributive and compensatory justice are not required, nor is the 
recommendation of interpretability. All remain preferences, but if there are other ways of 
completing the life-defining task, then the ML implementation does have flexibility in abiding by 
distributive and compensatory justice, as the potential user has the freedom to avoid the 
implementation or compare the implementation’s results with those arrived at through non-ML 
methods.  
4.4.2.3 Not a Life-Defining Need  
This scenario has the same consequences as 2. First, a distinction need not be made between a 
non-life-defining task with or without alternatives, as the freedom for the individual exists to 
avoid the task altogether. Second, it is possible that a difference should be established between 
the restrictions on life-defining tasks with alternatives and non-life-defining tasks with or without 
alternatives. The rationale here is that in all three cases, the potential user is making a choice to 
prioritize performance over justice. There are instances in life-defining needs where we are 
aware that our solution is far from perfect, but that it is the best approach currently available. The 
point is that the choice being made, although of varying importance, is of the same nature.  
 
 
 
83 We will discuss interpretability in detail in 4.4.3.  
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4.4.2.4 Considerations 
So, to address all three scenarios, the next consideration is as follows: 
CONSIDERATION: Are there non-ML alternatives for accomplishing the task in question?  
4.4.3 Explainable and Interpretable ML 
The requirement of freedom of choice is insufficient, if we do not understand the choices at our 
disposal. This is based on the idea that freedom of choice is not fully free unless the choice has 
the opportunity to be fully informed and reasoned (that is, that all decision-making information is 
at one’s disposal).84 Thus, we must discuss black-box models, and contrast them with 
interpretable ones. Black-box models are oftentimes criticized for their inability to provide a 
rationale as to how they arrive at a certain conclusion. This is why the general framework will 
advise against implementation of black-box models when the user intends to complete a life-
defining task and has no other non-ML alternatives.  
There are, however, exceptions to the restricted use of black-box models in safety and 
physiological needs – if the subject in question has a choice in whether they are exposed to it. 
Once again, assume that a subject has cancer and is looking for the optimal treatment. They will 
get recommendations from a certified physician (who can explain the rationale behind their 
recommendation) and a black-box ML model. Based on previous data, the ML model gives 
recommendations that lead to remission 30% more often than those of the physician. It is likely 
that some would be willing to place more trust in a model that seems to do better than the 
average physician (even in the absence of rationale), while some may find the physician’s 
rationale to be very reasonable and place trust in the explanation instead. This warrants a 
comparison between interpretability and explainability.  
In ML, both interpretability and explainability are about making sense of how and why a certain 
model arrives at certain conclusions. Interpretability refers to when an algorithm is intuitive and 
understandable without full expertise on the topic (this usually refers to a certain subset of 
methods, such as Naïve Bayes classifiers and rule-based ML). Explainability is, as the word 
implies, when there are ways to make sense of and simplify complex and non-intuitive 
algorithms (among these are neural networks).85 Worth noting is that the type of algorithm is not 
always what defines the interpretability or explainability of a model – sometimes it is the number 
of features in the considered dataset. With explainable ML86, computer scientists oftentimes must 
write programs to help explain the model (due to the complexity of the data and algorithm), 
whereas with interpretable ML the structure and rationale of the model makes the classification 
process more transparent and directly understandable. 
 
84 Wells, Thomas. “Free Choice Is Informed Choice: Why We Need Ethical Warning Labels on Animal Products.” 
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85 Lawton, George. “UX Defines Chasm between Explainable vs. Interpretable AI.” SearchEnterpriseAI. 
TechTarget, December 24, 2019. https://searchenterpriseai.techtarget.com/feature/UX-defines-chasm-between-
explainable-vs-interpretable-AI. 
86 We will use “Explainable ML” and “black-box” interchangeably. 
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ML scientist Cynthia Rudin brings up an array of issues with explainable ML.87 Commonly, the 
case is made that explainable ML is deployed because of its superior performance. This may be 
true occasionally, which is why black-box algorithms are still warranted from time to time – but 
not always. Rudin claims from experience that in most contexts, there are interpretable ML 
implementations that would have equal or better accuracy compared to their explainable 
counterparts.  
Furthermore, the fact that programs are needed to make sense of black-box algorithms implies 
that even the explanations provided for the model in question are not doing the full model 
justice. If the original model were fully explainable, we would not need a program to explain it 
for us. As Rudin herself puts it:  
An explainable model that has a 90% agreement with the original model indeed explains 
the original model most of the time. However, an explanation model that is correct 90% 
of the time is wrong 10% of the time. If a tenth of the explanations are incorrect, one 
cannot trust the explanations, and thus one cannot trust the original black box. If we 
cannot know for certain whether our explanation is correct, we cannot know whether to 
trust either the explanation or the original model.88 
Explainable ML also has weaknesses in not being able to properly accommodate the specific 
circumstances of each subject, as well as increasing the probability of human error due to the 
extensive preprocessing needed to ensure that all data is correct. Preprocessing data for 
interpretable models with fewer features is doable – doing the same for a program like COMPAS 
with more than 130 features is difficult in comparison.  
Rudin advocates for more interpretable ML models instead of explainable ones, as they make us 
able to more efficiently analyze its flaws. They are sometimes more difficult to construct 
algorithmically but allow subjects who are not necessarily experts on the topic of ML to 
intuitively understand how they are being assessed.89 
Occam’s Razor, a principle used extensively and that has empirically been proven very useful in 
analysis, becomes relevant here. The principle has multiple different formulations, but the main 
one attributed to theologian William of Ockham is: “Plurality must never be posited without 
necessity.”90 The gist of the statement is that if one has competing solutions to a problem, then 
the simplest (most understandable) solution is preferred. The case is made that excessive 
complexity leads to more potentially unfounded assumptions, which in turn reduce the credibility 
of one’s solution. For this reason, it would never make sense to choose a black-box model when 
other interpretable models have similar performance. Furthermore, it would also be unwise to 
consult explainable ML if interpretable ML has not been attempted. This is why the framework 
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advises that if the task in question never has been completed using ML, that the first attempt 
should be with an interpretable model.  
4.4.3.1 Considerations 
Thus, the following considerations: 
CONSIDERATION: Is this a black-box model?  
CONSIDERATION: Is this the first time the task is being completed with ML? 
CONSIDERATION: Do interpretable models with similar performance exist?  
Due to the importance of having interpretability, this framework recommends that if a certain 
task never has been pursued previously, that the first attempt is made with an interpretable model 
before consulting other, potentially black-box solutions.  
Assuming that explainable models only are implemented when performing better than 
interpretable ones, when we are faced with a choice between an interpretable model (ML or non-
ML) and an explainable model, it is essentially a choice between interpretability and 
performance. But, in the case of black-box models, you really do not know for certain what the 
choice is. Since black-box models cannot be fully rationalized and interpreted, there is no way to 
justify them being the sole option under any circumstance in which avoiding the task altogether 
is not a choice (that is, if it addresses a life-defining need). Thus, the framework does not allow 
black-box models for use in life-defining tasks with no other alternatives. In these cases, there is 
not a choice to be made between interpretability and performance, and in those situations (as 
elaborated on previously), we prioritize interpretability. Although our societies and judicial 
systems oftentimes are consequentialist, we still place importance on how consequences come 
about. Otherwise, our courts would consider manslaughter and murder to be the same thing since 
the outcomes are nearly identical – but they do not. Clearly, the rationale by which a decision is 
made is significant, which the prioritization of interpretability emphasizes in this context. 
Do note that this framework does not ensure that should one opt for a non-ML solution, one will 
avoid the injustices that come with the model in question. It just ensures that ML is not 
responsible for the injustices, and that if it is, that one has chosen to subject oneself to them. This 
does not, however, mean that the responsibility lies entirely on the user. There should also exist 
accountability for entities to provide the right information and having the right intentions.  
4.5 Accountability 
In our current societies, there are many incentives for entities to deploy ML for various tasks. It 
saves money because, unlike humans, it does not require financial compensation. It saves time 
because it can make inferences from immense amounts of data in a fraction of the time required 
for a human being.  
Most importantly for entities, however, ML saves accountability (although this applies to 
automation and AI holistically). Due to ML being applied to new and unexplored contexts 
constantly, there are few to no ways of deciding legally who is responsible for failures in 
distributive and compensatory justice. This has become a large discussion topic in the context of 
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self-driving car accidents and accompanying liabilities.91 But, as the Voltaire-inspired Peter 
Parker principle famously states: “With great power comes great responsibility.” 92 This rationale 
has been used by ethicists to justify the accountability being placed on developers of the 
decision-making algorithms. Kirsten Martin, business ethics professor at George Washington 
University, says:  
As such, firms should be responsible not only for the value-laden-ness of an algorithm 
but also for designing who-does-what within the algorithmic decision. As such, firms 
developing algorithms are accountable for designing how large a role individual will be 
permitted to take in the subsequent algorithmic decision. Counter to current arguments, I 
find that if an algorithm is designed to preclude individuals from taking responsibility 
within a decision, then the designer of the algorithm should be held accountable for the 
ethical implications of the algorithm in use.93 
Responsibility for failure in these models should be put on a defined set of individuals prior to 
launch. There should never be ambiguity in whom to consult (or blame) in situations of injustice, 
and the incentives for entities and individuals should not exist to avoid accountability through 
ML (especially if they are already benefitting from savings of money and time).  
4.5.1.1 Considerations 
Thus, the following consideration:  
CONSIDERATION: Are the individuals behind the model’s development claiming full 
responsibility for failure in fulfilling the requirements of distributive and compensatory justice?  
If the answer is yes, the model could be allowed implementation in some form. If there are flaws 
in distributive and compensatory justice prior to launch, these should be publicly disclosed for 
freedom of choice to be a reality. If the answer is no, the model should not be allowed 
implementation without exception.  
Worth noting is that accountability only applies to the impactors and impacted of the model in 
question. Thus, if a supposedly unjust ML model is to be implemented on a smaller scale, if 
consensus can be found among all exposed individuals, the model should still be allowed 
implementation due to it being within the freedom of choice of aforementioned individuals to 
subject themselves to the model. This is helpful, as there may exist businesses and individuals 
who can benefit from the use of ML on a small scale, but do not have the resources to create 
robust and generally equitable models. 
 
91 Nyholm, Sven R., and J. Smids. ”Automated cars meet human drivers: responsible human-robot coordination and 
the ethics of mixed traffic.” Ethics and Information Technology, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9445-9 
92 “With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility.” Quote Investigator, May 28, 2019. 
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/07/23/great-power/. 
93 Martin, Kirsten E. “Ethical Implications and Accountability of Algorithms.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3056716. 
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4.6 Pre-Implementation Flowchart 
And thus, we arrive at the below flowchart representation for considerations prior to 
implementation: 
Figure 5: Flowchart representation of the implementation framework. 
4.7 Post-Implementation Accountability 
The above flowchart only accounts for considerations before implementing a certain ML model. 
Nevertheless, there are considerations for situations that may occur after implementation as well. 
After all, many of the issues that arise in ML result from use of the respective models in applied 
contexts. Thus far, the framework has encouraged increased general conscientiousness and 
accountability in developing and deploying ML, with additional caution being advised in 
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situations of life-defining needs (to avoid catastrophic situations like that of Omega Young).94 
Finally, before concluding our analysis of the issue at hand, we must ensure the same exactitude 
and accountability as the models are applied in the real world.  
The requirements of transparency, distributive and compensatory justice are truly difficult to 
satisfy for most ML models. They must be. There is a reason only a select few models warrant 
implementation for life-defining needs when no other non-ML alternatives are available. 
Therefore, this cannot be understated: good ML models are works in progress and must be 
treated as such. This is where restorative justice plays a role.  
4.7.1 Restorative Justice 
To echo Adam Smith’s thoughts regarding virtue, accountability does not imply achieved 
perfection.95 This framework openly allows implementation even in cases where distributive 
and/or compensatory justice requirements are not met. Accountability implies the ambition of 
perfection. It implies that if justice requirements are not met, that the producer of the model 
intends to improve the algorithm, with intentions to make it more just with time. Restorative 
justice can aid us in doing that efficiently.  
Restorative justice concerns itself with holding responsible subjects accountable for wrongdoings 
by having them fix their problems through cooperation with and understanding of victims. It is 
the idea that offenders should be allowed the opportunity to right their wrongs without additional 
criminal punishment. Howard Zehr, a pioneer in the field of restorative justice, outlines the 
concept and its rationale using these three principles:  
- Crime is a violation of people and of interpersonal relationships. 
- Violations create obligations. 
- The central obligation is to put right the wrongs.96 
Admittedly, restorative justice was developed as a new way to deal with crime. Many of the 
wrongs made in good faith and by mistake in ML will not be considered crimes by our legal 
systems (and our framework), and so “crime” may not be the right word to use in this context. 
Replacing “crime” with “injustice” in the context of ML will make these principles strongly 
applicable to what we want to achieve. In the case of failure in fulfilling the outlined 
requirements of distributive and/or compensatory justice, it is important that there exists an 
expectation for the entity responsible to improve the model. We do not want to punish entities 
for honest mistakes – instead, we want to encourage a deeper understanding of the users’ 
problems, so that they can efficiently be dealt with.  
It is here that we argue that competition provided by free markets in liberal societies will, to a 
certain extent, automatically encourage companies to improve their models if the flaws are 
publicly disclosed – even if that were not the initial intention.97 If people affected know the flaws 
of a certain application, they will move toward other solutions that do not discriminate, should 
 
94 See 4.2. 
95 See 4.3. 
96 Zehr, Howard. The Little Book of Restorative Justice. Vancouver, B.C.: Langara College, 2016. 
97 See 4.5. 
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they appear. Having the flaws publicly exposed will make the lack of discrimination a truly 
marketable trait of a model. Free markets – to the extent that they are reasonable – are also 
especially important, to increase the likelihood of full accommodation of fairness.98 If there are 
more options to consider, the likelihood that an individual will align with the fairness definition 
of at least one of them is larger than if options are fewer. In that regard, when there are no “right” 
answers, markets can aid us in providing more solutions (of different nature) to the same 
problem, making more people content in the process.99 
4.7.2 Criminal Justice 
We mentioned previously that there are incentives for entities to pursue ML solutions other than 
proficiency in solving a problem. For that reason, if a model saves an entity time and money the 
way it already is, there would not be much incentive to fully disclose the issues with it, as well as 
dealing with the concerns of users. If there is no intention to improve the deficient model, it 
shows that the company did not make the model with the improvement of the human condition in 
mind, but for the other incentives provided by the market. This is where we get to the issues of 
entities and individuals failing to hold themselves accountable and required criminal justice as a 
result. 
Due to the inductive nature of ML and the inherent biases of human beings, there should be room 
for trial and error in developing what we consider a just application. Nevertheless, these trials 
should be done in good faith. There should be a distinction between the treatment of those who 
mistakenly implemented inadequate applications, and those who did so knowingly. With 
accountability comes the intention to work towards better – not cheaper and more time efficient 
– solutions.  
4.7.2.1 Considerations 
Thus, the following consideration:  
CONSIDERATION: In the case of failure in fulfilling the requirements of distributive and 
compensatory justice, was there negligence or reluctance to deal with obvious problems?  
If no, then restorative justice measures should be taken.  If yes, then criminal justice measures 
should be taken.  
One may have differing views on what “obvious” problems are. We argue that the definition 
should regard the problems brought to light during algorithmic auditing. For instance, assuming 
one uses ORCAA’s approach, obvious problems can be defined as those brought up in the 
development of the ethical matrix.100 Nevertheless, it would be dependent on how algorithmic 
auditing is done. 
 
98 Some of these forecasts may seem too optimistic due to the influence we believe future human-centered 
economies will have on our current incentive structures. This is further addressed in 5.  
99 The consideration in regard to restorative justice will be addressed in 4.7.2. 
100 See 4.3. 
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4.7.3 Additional Comments 
To reiterate, restorative justice measures will have to continue until there are no evident biases in 
the respective programs, which likely will be – never. Criminal justice measures are only 
warranted if restorative justice has been encouraged and denied by the entity in question.  
Although we have developed a framework based on deontological arguments, our current legal 
frameworks are based on consequentialism. The interplay between restorative and criminal 
justice accounts for the consequentialist nature of our legal statutes, while still emphasizing the 
importance of a deontological approach to societal issues. It also allows for a distinction between 
good and bad intentions.  
We will not elaborate on the nature of and approach to criminal justice, as we believe measures 
can be taken to make criminal justice a non-necessity in the future (as we will discuss briefly 
later). Nevertheless, assuming the current structure of our economy, it is important that the 
criminal punishment is severe enough, so that it disincentivizes the act of wrongdoing. As 2020 
U.S Presidential Candidate Andrew Yang expresses on his website when discussing the lack of 
accountability for pharmaceutical companies in the opioid crisis: “Purdue Pharma has made 
more than $35 billion in revenue since releasing OxyContin in 1995. The fine of $635 million for 
false advertising around claims of non-addictiveness and tamper-proofing is barely a slap on the 
wrist.”101 If we are to take the route of criminal justice, we need to ensure that the repercussions 
are not merely a “slap on the wrist” to incentivize just measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 Yang, Andrew. “Hold Pharmaceutical Companies Accountable - Yang2020 - Andrew Yang for President.” 
Yang2020. Accessed March 29, 2020. https://www.yang2020.com/policies/holding-pharmaceutical-companies-
accountable/. 
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5 Reflections on Work and Future Areas of Research 
 
Conceiving a new framework from scratch has been challenging, and multiple different 
approaches were taken before arriving at the one seen in this thesis. Considering that this was a 
first attempt at an ethical framework for the implementation of ML, it is more than possible that 
there are other thoughts and philosophical theories that could contribute to the framework, either 
by replacing certain parts or adding substance to the current structure. Hopefully this serves as a 
reason for other models to be developed, which take new stances on the topic in question.  
The main importance was to develop considerations that had a common thread of logic, without 
making the framework overwhelmingly technical. This work is intended for anyone affected by 
ML, either as impactor or impacted. Today, that is essentially everyone. For this reason, it was 
important to develop guidelines that are, to a large extent, understandable to most or all human 
beings. We believe that this work has succeeded in this regard, and that with additional 
constructive feedback, can help spur discussion about a field that needs more serious 
consideration in the near future.  
One weakness of the current framework is that it does not consider the hierarchy of importance 
in Rawls’ three principles of distributive justice. By this framework, you either fulfill the 
requirements (along with compensatory justice) or you do not. It may be the case that if the 
model does not fulfill the first subconsideration, that implementation should not be advised in 
any context.102 A future ambition would be to take this first attempt and after extensive feedback 
elaborate on some of the gaps in collaboration with other peers. In 2017, IEEE started 
developing a “Standard for Algorithmic Bias Considerations” to provide a guideline for involved 
program architects and project leaders.103 We hope to see more analysis of the IEEE Standard, 
along with other frameworks (including ours), to assess their strengths and weaknesses in 
addressing bias in ML. 
We recognize that the current framework needs legal backing of some nature to serve a 
substantive purpose. Entities will rarely abide by an ethical framework if the economy 
incentivizes other action. This has only recently become recognized in law, with the European 
Union establishing action against algorithmic bias in its 2018 General Data Production 
Regulation (GDPR).104 The U.S has now also understood the necessity for legal action, with a 
bill – the Algorithmic Accountability Act – being introduced to the House of Representatives in 
2019. 105 106 These measures are indeed important, but it will be of essence to ensure that the 
 
102 See 4.1.2.1. 
103 Koene, Ansgar, Liz Dowthwaite, and Suchana Seth. “IEEE P7003™ Standard for Algorithmic Bias 
Considerations.” Proceedings of the International Workshop on Software Fairness - FairWare 18, 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3194770.3194773. 
104 “What Does the GDPR Mean for Business and Consumer Technology Users.” GDPR.eu, February 13, 2019. 
https://gdpr.eu/what-the-regulation-means-for-everyday-internet-user/. 
105 “Booker, Wyden, Clarke Introduce Bill Requiring Companies To Target Bias In Corporate Algorithms.” Cory 
Booker | U.S. Senator for New Jersey, April 10, 2019. https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=903. 
106 Robertson, Adi. “A New Bill Would Force Companies to Check Their Algorithms for Bias.” The Verge. The 
Verge, April 10, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/10/18304960/congress-algorithmic-accountability-act-
wyden-clarke-booker-bill-introduced-house-senate. 
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regulations in question are carried out efficiently and with realistic expectations, which will take 
trial and error.  
In this regard, one area that needs serious research and consideration is incentive structures 
within our respective economies that would make the implementation of the above outlined 
framework practically possible. First, it may be the case that even if there are compensatory 
justice requirements to consider, that the criminal justice measures are too mild for companies to 
want to avoid them. In other words, there exist scenarios in which companies would skip the 
considerations of compensatory and distributive justice for the purpose of profitability. The 
reason we chose not to elaborate on the specifics of criminal justice is because we believe that in 
the right economy, we barely need criminal justice. In a human-centered economy, where there 
are incentives to justly and ethically implement technology for the benefit of all, we believe 
negligence and reluctance would be non-factors in the greater scheme of things, and that 
restorative justice would take precedence. Currently, our economy has financial incentives. A 
prime example in the context of ML is data collection. Gathering datasets specifically made for 
the context in question is much more expensive than to train the model with already existing, 
more general datasets. Due to the financial incentives of companies, and the fact that they are the 
ones investing in such a service, they will see little reason to invest additionally to make up for 
what they consider small deficiencies in their programs. This would be different in an economy 
that prioritizes the wellbeing of its people. The idea of human-centered capitalism has been 
popularized by individuals like 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus and 2020 U.S 
Presidential Candidate Andrew Yang.107 We realize that this suggested research may arrive at 
non-capitalist recommendations, which would require changes in our framework as it currently 
relies on our contemporary incentive structures. Nevertheless, more research on how to 
practically implement a human-centered economy will alleviate some of the issues not only in 
ML, but in other contexts of our societal reality. That could only be a good thing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 Bornstein, David. “Giving Capitalism a Social Conscience.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 
October 10, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/opinion/giving-capitalism-a-social-conscience.html. 
See also: “Humanity Forward.” Humanity Forward. Accessed March 30, 2020. https://movehumanityforward.com/. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
In a world of booming technology, it is imperative that actions are taken to ensure that our 
advancements are not used for purposes other than the improvement of the human condition. In 
that regard, computer scientists have taken measures to try to accommodate the importance of 
justice and fairness in our ML applications. Our analysis confirms that both concepts are not 
always simple to integrate into our mathematical models, which should encourage us to be 
increasingly conscientious about how and when we implement ML and discourage us from using 
ML in every technically applicable context. In this endeavor, we completed a first effort to 
develop a framework that accommodates for present limitations in both human beings and 
technology and sets what we believe are realistic expectations for developers and entities to 
follow.  
The practical measures to be taken for this theoretical framework to properly work are many, and 
the framework is limited in its ability. Nevertheless, our developed implementation 
considerations provide a foundation to build on and start the conversation on a topic worthy of 
further discussion and elaboration. The potential gaps of the thesis do not detract from the fact 
that we need a framework with which to assess the implementation of machine learning, and that 
just as in the field it intends to target, it will require trial and error to optimize. This should only 
serve as the beginning of a field in desperate need of growth. We hope to witness this 
progression in the coming months and years.  
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